Baseball has embraced data and analytics in its decision making, This approach is often referred to as Moneyball, largely in reference to what Billy Beane was doing with the 2002 Oakland Athletics.
Beane’s Moneyball was not exactly the core of much of his personnel decision-making process. He chose to look at the margins of the game in order to find what he considered good cheap pickups in an incredibly competitive market. These players were the so-called market inefficiency that the 2002 Oakland A’s front office found. They were high on-base type guys that other teams did not value nearly as much as Beane did.
Billy Beane’s vision is why the 32 year old Scott Hatteberg signed a 1-year, $900K contract and went to hit 15 HR get on-base at .374 clip and contribute a career best 3.2 WAR. That 2002 A’s roster is full of players who were past their prime but were integral to success—John Mabry, David Justice, and even Ray Durham. In reality, that team only used these Moneyball guys to fill out the roster. They had Eric Chavez and Miguel Tejada as true star-caliber players to compliment Barry Zito, Mark Mulder, and Tim Hudson as a Big Three in the rotation. That purpose was not to build a full roster, but to complete a roster with some holes in the lineup.
In the decade and a half since, teams have fully bought in into analytics and data as a model of roster construction. This means that the organizations who don’t adapt will be left behind. Teams can no longer focus exclusively on the eye test, traditional scouting, and conventional wisdom to remain truly competitive in the long term.
The most notable holdout in the analytics revolution is the Philadelphia Phillies. On the other hand, there are few teams as committed to the new model as the Cleveland Indians. The strengths and weaknesses of both of these models are on full display right now in Philadelphia and Cleveland. One team is clearly on the rise and the other seems to be in for what could be a very long summer and a couple more lean years.
A great example of this is how proactive the Indians have been in locking up some of their key performers to long term deals in the past year or so. In 2014, they signed two of their premiere position players, Jason Kipnis and Michael Brantley. This year, they have signed two bright pitchers in 2014 Cy Young Award winner Corey Kluber and the hard throwing Carlos Carrasco. All of these players will be entering their primes and the Indians have all of them under team control and exceedingly team-friendly deals for the medium term.
Another notable pickup made by the Indians was the acquisition of Brandon Moss from the Oakland A’s during the Winter Meetings. All of these players will be integral to the Cleveland Indians success in the short and medium term. A large part of sabermetric thought, or more aptly data-based decision making, is based on being sensible in how to spend money.
These were good moves by the Indians not only because they recognized the talent of the players, but they actually were able to retain their services on very favorable terms. This is how baseball has changed since the 2002 A’s began the revolution. Once upon a time, it was considered innovative to consider analytics even at the margins of roster construction. Now it is so accepted that it would be ridiculous not to take advantage of what you have and build a team inside-out using all the data available.
In sharp contrast lay the Philadelphia Phillies, who look poised to have a very long summer and then go through a long rebuilding period. The core of this Phillies squad is basically the same as the one who won two consecutive NL pennants and one World Series in 2008 and 2009.
Chase Utley is one of the best offensive second basemen of this generation, but he is now 36 years old and owed as much as $60 million if he meets the terms of his vesting option. Ryan Howard, who was once the foremost power hitter in the game, is 35 and is still owed at the very least $60 million over the next three years. The story continues with 36 year old Carlos Ruiz who stil has $18 million coming to him over the next three years.
The Phillies have an older team with a lot of bad contracts and a GM who is not willing to listen to any trade offers that are short of spectacular. This has much less to do with the Phillies skepticism of advanced analytics than their unwillingness to let go off the past and start over. The best thing they could do right now is cut ties with Amaro, trade these aging stars, and restock the farm system.
What made for good baseball teams in 2008 is no longer true. Holding onto that model will not work from now on. It’s simple: adapt or die.